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A  TEXTUAL  ANALYSIS  OF  WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS  UNDER  THE  DODD-FRANK  ACT
Brent T. Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted and Presi-
dent Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).1  The purpose of Dodd-Frank was
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system.”2  One mechanism
Dodd-Frank’s drafters crafted for improving accountability in the financial
system was a comprehensive whistleblower incentives and protections pro-
gram.3  Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program followed in the footsteps of pre-
vious remedial legislation—namely the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”)4—with
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2015.  I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey
Pojanowski for his helpful advice and guidance throughout the writing process, Professor
Amy Coney Barrett and my fellow members of her statutory interpretation seminar for
enlightening discussions, my friends at the Notre Dame Law Review for their thoughtful
edits, and, of course, my family for their love and support.  All errors are my own.
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26, 28,
31, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html?_r
=0.  For a discussion of the causes of the financial crisis and a timeline of events, see FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011).
2 124 Stat. at 1376; see also Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform,
29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 96 (2012) (characterizing Dodd-Frank as “the government’s historic
response to the causes of the [2008] economic crisis”).
3 See Dodd-Frank § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841–49 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u–6); see also Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C., Whistle-Blowers and Sarbanes-Oxley, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/the-s-e-c-whistleblowers-and-
sarbanes-oxley/ (noting Dodd-Frank’s requirements that the SEC “pay at least 10 percent,
and as much as 30 percent, of any monetary penalties more than $1 million” to
whistleblowers).
4 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also William W. Bratton,
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1023, 1024 (2003) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as a legislative response to the 2002 finan-
cial crisis “intended to address the scandals and restore confidence in the securities mar-
kets, responds by regulating the accounting profession”). But see Richard E. Moberly,
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the intention that Dodd-Frank would “build on existing legislation to remedy
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and provide strong compliance and
reporting incentive structures to prevent future market failures.”5
Since its enactment, Dodd-Frank has avoided the main difficulties in
application that whistleblowers under SOX experienced—i.e., questions of
“who” within an organization may be classified as a whistleblower.6  However,
circuits have split on the question of “what” a whistleblower must do in order
to receive Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation protections.  The controversy has
turned on the interaction between two specific provisions of Dodd-Frank.
The first provision is the section that defines the term “whistleblower” for the
purposes of the whistleblower provisions—15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6).7  The
definitional section states: “In this section the following definitions shall
apply: . . . The term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”8
The second provision is the section that outlines the Act’s antiretaliation pro-
tections for whistleblowers—15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A).9  It provides:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly
or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in
the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by
the whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this
section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial
or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such
information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, including section
78j–1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of title 18, and any other law, rule, or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.10
Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 65 (2007) (finding that “during its first three years, only 3.6% of
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won relief through the initial administrative process that
adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5% of whistleblowers won appeals through the
process”).
5 Zizi Petkova, Note, Interpreting the Anti-Retaliation Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, 18 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 574 (2016).
6 See Samuel C. Leifer, Note, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act,
113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 123 (2014) (noting that “SOX was unclear about which individuals
within an organization are entitled to whistleblower protections,” e.g., “direct employees of
a company versus employees of a company’s contractors”).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6) (2012).  This section will be referred to throughout this
Note as the definitional section.
8 Id. (emphasis added).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A).  This section will be referred to throughout this Note
as the antiretaliation provision or whistleblower protection provision.
10 Id. (emphasis added).
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In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit held that the plain
language of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition and antiretaliation provi-
sion restricted the law’s protections “to those individuals who provide ‘infor-
mation relating to a violation of the securities laws’ to the SEC.”11  In
contrast, the Second Circuit held in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC that the ten-
sion between Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower definition and its antiretaliation
provision “renders [the whistleblower provisions] as a whole sufficiently
ambiguous to oblige us to give Chevron deference to” the SEC’s interpreta-
tion that internal reporting is sufficient to invoke the statute’s protections.12
This Note endorses the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, and argues that
the plain language of Dodd-Frank limits its whistleblower protections to indi-
viduals who provide information to the SEC.  This Note argues that the rea-
soning of the Second Circuit relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
King v. Burwell is inapposite, and that the Second Circuit introduced ambigu-
ity where no ambiguity previously existed and improperly extended Chevron
deference to the SEC.13  Part I briefly describes the interpretive rule adopted
by the SEC, as well as the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Asadi and the
Second Circuit in Berman.  Part II analyzes the plain language of the statute
using judicial canons of construction to show that the text of Dodd-Frank is
not ambiguous, and is clearly limited to those making external reports to the
SEC.
I. ASADI, BERMAN, AND THE SEC
This Part first explains the SEC regulation interpreting Dodd-Frank’s
language, which in the SEC’s opinion is ambiguous.  Next, it explains the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., rejecting the
SEC’s interpretation because it did not consider the text to be ambiguous.
And finally, it explains the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, deferring to the SEC and creating a circuit split.
A. The SEC’s Interpretation
The SEC has taken the position that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provi-
sions are ambiguous.14  Namely, the SEC believes that Dodd-Frank’s defini-
tion of “whistleblower” creates a tension with the statute’s language defining
11 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6)); see also infra Section I.B.
12 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015); see also infra Section
I.C.
13 Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14 See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, 80 Fed. Reg. 47,829, 47,829 (Aug. 10, 2015) [hereinafter SEC
Interpretive Rule] (“[W]e recognized that Section 21F is ambiguous . . . .”).
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the scope of the antiretaliation protections.15  Accordingly, the SEC has
promulgated regulations and interpretive rules that seek to reconcile the
purported ambiguities.  Relevant to the circuit split at hand, the SEC issued
Exchange Act Rule 21–F2, pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Dodd-
Frank, which states, in relevant part:
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by [Dodd-
Frank], you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are provid-
ing relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a
possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in Section
21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)(A)).
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy the require-
ments, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.16
In enacting its rule, the SEC stated that it understood its regulations to
create two definitions of “whistleblower”: one that mirrored Dodd-Frank’s
definition, for the purposes of receiving the whistleblower monetary incen-
tives and heightened confidentiality protections, and a second, broader than
the first, for the purposes of receiving antiretaliation protections.17  Accord-
ingly, under the SEC’s reading of the statute, “the availability of employment
retaliation protection is not conditioned on an individual’s adherence to the
Rule 21F–9(a) procedures [requiring reporting to the SEC],” and an individ-
ual who only made a report internally would receive protections.18
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Asadi
Khaled Asadi served from 2006 until 2011 as G.E. Energy’s Iraq Country
Executive.19  In that position, he worked from Amman, Jordan, to coordinate
on behalf of G.E. Energy with Iraq’s governing bodies in order to secure and
manage energy service contracts.20  In 2010, Asadi was informed by Iraqi offi-
cials that G.E. Energy had hired a close associate of a senior Iraqi official in
order to “curry favor” with that official and receive preferential treatment in
contract negotiations.21  Asadi reported the issue to his supervisors at G.E.
Energy due to his concern that G.E. Energy may have violated the Foreign
15 See id. at 47,830 (arguing that applying the narrower definition “is not consistent
with Rule 21F–2 and would undermine [the SEC’s] overall goals in implementing the
whistleblower program”).
16 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
17 SEC Interpretive Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 47,829–30.
18 Id. at 47,830.
19 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Asadi
v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, No. 4:12–345, 2012 WL 2522599, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 28,
2012).
20 Asadi, 2012 WL 2522599, at *1.
21 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 621.
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Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).22  A year later, Asadi was terminated by G.E.
Energy, and he filed his suit alleging that G.E. Energy had violated Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower protections by terminating him following his internal
report of the possible FCPA violation.23
As the first court of appeals to address Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provi-
sions,24 the Fifth Circuit faced two questions: (1) Was Asadi a whistleblower
within the meaning of Dodd-Frank, and (2) if he was a whistleblower, does
Dodd-Frank apply extraterritorially?  Because the court answered the first
question in the negative, it did not reach the second.25
The Fifth Circuit set out to “start and end [its] analysis with the text of
the relevant statute.”26  The primary ground for its decision was a point con-
ceded by the plaintiff himself: “[H]e is not a ‘whistleblower’ as that term is
defined [in the definitional section] because he did not provide any informa-
tion to the SEC.”27  Asadi did not claim that Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblower was ambiguous; instead, he based his ambiguity argument on
the perceived tension between the definition and the scope of the antiretalia-
tion protections.28  Under Asadi’s reading (and the SEC’s reading), the
antiretaliation provision is ambiguous because an individual could take
actions that fall within the third category of activity protected by the
antiretaliation provision—activity that does not necessarily require reporting
to the SEC—while failing to qualify as a whistleblower, and thus losing out on
the Act’s antiretaliation protections.29  To Asadi, the SEC, and others, this
outcome would undermine the very purpose for which the antiretaliation
provisions were put in place.30
The Fifth Circuit rejected these concerns.  The court’s opinion placed
particular emphasis on the fact that “whistleblower” was a defined term.
“[T]he placement of the three categories of protected activity in subsection
(h) follows the phrase ‘[n]o employer may discharge . . . or in any other
manner discriminate against, a whistleblower . . . because of any lawful act
done by the whistleblower.’”31  The court explained that “[t]he use of the term
‘whistleblower,’ as compared with terms such as ‘individual’ or ‘employee,’ is
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 721 (2014) (noting the
Fifth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to address the whistleblower provisions).
25 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 n.13.
26 Id. at 623.
27 Id. at 624.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 626.
30 See Pacella, supra note 24, at 751 (“By stripping aggrieved employee-whistleblowers
of the very protections that Dodd-Frank sought to provide, the decision in Asadi flies in the
face of the purpose of the statute in minimizing the fear of retaliation and motivating
whistleblowers to come forward with information pertaining to securities laws violations.”).
31 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A) (2012)).
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significant”32 because “the text of § 78u–6 clearly and unambiguously pro-
vides a single definition of ‘whistleblower.’”33
Asadi also argued that under the straightforward application of the
whistleblower definition, the third category of activity in the antiretaliation
provision was rendered superfluous—an outcome that weighed in favor of
the broader interpretation.34  The court rejected this argument, and in fact
argued that it was Asadi’s construction that rendered portions of the statute
superfluous by essentially writing the words “to the Commission” out of the
definitional section.35  In addition to violating the surplusage canon, the
court argued that Asadi’s construction would render SOX’s antiretaliation
provisions moot “because an individual who makes a disclosure that is pro-
tected by [SOX] . . . could also bring a Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection
claim on the basis that the disclosure was protected by SOX.”36  The court
argued that no whistleblower would choose to bring a claim under SOX
under Asadi’s construction because Dodd-Frank’s regime is so much more
attractive.37
Asadi’s final argument was based on the SEC regulation interpreting
Dodd-Frank to protect internal whistleblowing as well as external
whistleblowing.38  In Asadi’s view, given the ambiguous language of the stat-
ute, the Fifth Circuit should defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.39  The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons.  First, because the court
found the statute to be unambiguous, it found that this case failed the first
step of the Chevron test.40  Second, even assuming the language were ambigu-
ous, the court doubted that the SEC’s interpretation could be considered
“reasonable” given that its regulations concerning the whistleblower provi-
sion are “inconsistent”—namely, the court took a dim view of the SEC’s deci-
sion to adopt two definitions of “whistleblower,” one for the purpose of
receiving monetary awards and one for the purpose of antiretaliation
protection.41
32 Id.
33 Id. at 627.
34 Id. at 628.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 628–29 (noting that, compared to SOX, Dodd-Frank provides greater mone-
tary damages, does not require an administrative claim before bringing suit, and has a
substantially longer statute of limitations).
38 Id. at 629 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b)(1) (2015)).
39 Id. at 629–30; cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
40 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
41 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630; see SEC Interpretive Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 47,829, 47,829–30
(Aug. 10, 2015) (explaining the SEC’s position that there are two definitions of
“whistleblower”: one for awards and one for antiretaliation); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at
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Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the narrower interpretation of § 78u–6
was the only reasonable interpretation given the scope of Dodd-Frank’s defi-
nition of “whistleblower.”
C. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Berman
Daniel Berman was the finance director of Neo@Ogilvy LLC, a subsidi-
ary of the advertising firm WPP PLC.42  While employed at Neo@Ogilvy,
Berman alleged he discovered various practices that amounted to accounting
fraud and violated generally accepted accounting principles, Sarbanes-Oxley,
and Dodd-Frank.43  He reported his discovery internally, and did not make
any report to the SEC until after he had been terminated in retaliation for
his whistleblowing.44  Berman, like Asadi, argued that the tension between
the definitional section and the antiretaliation protections rendered the stat-
ute ambiguous, and that the proper reading was not to require
whistleblowers to make external reports before making Dodd-Frank’s protec-
tions available.45  The Second Circuit agreed.46
At the outset of its discussion, the Second Circuit analogized to King v.
Burwell.47  As in King, the Second Circuit argued, the court faced the ques-
tion of determining how—if at all—imperfectly drafted portions of a statute
should work together.48  While the court recognized that “there is no abso-
lute conflict between the Commission notification requirement in the defini-
tion [section] and the absence of such requirement in both subdivision (iii)
of [the antiretaliation provision of] Dodd-Frank and the Sarbanes-Oxley pro-
visions” incorporated by reference,49 the court nevertheless found a “signifi-
cant tension within subsection 21F.”50  In the court’s opinion, applying the
Commission reporting requirement in the definitional section would leave
the antiretaliation protections in subsection (iii) “with an extremely limited
scope.”51
The court outlined several reasons it saw that “extremely limited scope”
as problematic.  First, it expressed discomfort with the idea that, in order to
843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
42 See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2015); Magistrate
Judge’s Report & Recommendation, No. 14–CV–00523, 2014 WL 6865718, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2014), adopted in part by Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 410–11
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
43 Berman, 801 F.3d at 149.
44 Id.
45 See Berman, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08; see also Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626; see also supra
notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
46 Berman, 801 F.3d at 146.
47 See id. at 150.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 151.
51 Id.
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receive whistleblower protections under subsection (iii), a whistleblower
would need to make simultaneous reports internally and to the Commis-
sion—the court thought the number of whistleblowers who would take that
route would be “few in number.”52  It noted that at least some whistleblowers
will feel that “reporting only to their employer offers the prospect of having
the wrongdoing ended, with little chance of retaliation, whereas reporting to
a government agency creates a substantial risk of retaliation.”53
Second, the court was uncomfortable with the fact that “there are cate-
gories of whistleblowers who cannot report wrongdoing to the Commission
until after they have reported the wrongdoing to their employer”—particu-
larly auditors and attorneys.54  For the court, it was significant that SOX pro-
visions covering auditors and attorneys require internal reporting before
external reporting to the Commission is contemplated.55  The court saw the
limited extra protections available under Dodd-Frank’s subsection (iii) com-
pared to SOX as problematic, and as a source of tension.56
The court noted the general rule that the definitions provided for terms
within a section are to be applied literally throughout the section, but argued
that the general rule was not applicable in this context because subsection
(iii) was added to the statute late in the legislative process.57  In the court’s
eyes, the question was not whether the definition section should be applied
literally, but whether Congress intended the definition of “whistleblower” to
be applied to subsection (iii) at all.58  For the court, a debate about whether
a particular construction would render a provision of Dodd-Frank or another
statute superfluous was beside the point.59  Instead, the court was willing to
chalk up the confusion to the “realities of the legislative process”:
When conferees are hastily trying to reconcile House and Senate bills,
each of which number hundreds of pages, and someone succeeds in




55 For auditors, Sarbanes-Oxley requires an auditor to first inform the appropriate
level of management under certain circumstances, and only permits reporting of illegal
activity to the SEC if both the management and board of the company first fail to take
remedial action when made aware of illegal acts. Id.  Likewise, for attorneys under
Sarbanes-Oxley, they are expected to first make their reports internally to the company’s
chief legal counsel, and only report to the Commission if the company fails to take appro-
priate action. Id. at 151–52.
56 Id. at 152 (noting auditors and attorneys “would gain little, if any, Dodd-Frank pro-
tection” if subsection (iii) only protects external reporting). But see infra text accompany-
ing notes 107–18.
57 Berman, 801 F.3d at 154.
58 Id. (“The issue here, however, is not whether to read the words of the definitional
section literally, but the different issue of whether the definition should apply to a late-
added subdivision of a subsection that uses the defined term.”).
59 Id.; see also supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
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surprising that no one noticed that the new subdivision and the definition of
“whistleblower” do not fit together neatly.60
In the court’s opinion, the realities of the legislative process militated in
favor of giving the drafters the benefit of the doubt, and arguably supported
a broader reading of subsection (iii) rather than a more literal application.61
Ultimately, the court held that the conflict was sufficient to render the text of
the statute ambiguous, and therefore obliged the court to grant Chevron def-
erence to the SEC’s interpretation that external reporting was not
required.62
II. A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF DODD-FRANK
This Part carries out an independent analysis of Dodd-Frank’s text in
order to determine the proper scope of the whistleblower antiretaliation pro-
tections and conclude whether the Fifth Circuit or Second Circuit reached
the correct outcome.
The starting point for the analysis of any statute must be the statutory
language itself.  As the Supreme Court has said, “In interpreting a statute,
‘[o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous,’ . . . and
‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”63  One category of tools
for the interpretation of statutes is the semantic canons of construction.64
The canons are a set of background principles and common sense rules
designed to assist the judiciary when interpreting statutes, and to provide a
unifying framework for the construction of statutes that allow courts to main-
tain consistency throughout the law.65  Though they are not binding law,
60 Berman, 801 F.3d at 154.
61 Id. at 155 (“Ultimately, we think it doubtful that the conferees who accepted the
last-minute insertion of subdivision (iii) would have expected it to have the extremely lim-
ited scope it would have if it were restricted by [the external reporting requirements].”).
62 Id. (“[W]e need not definitively construe the statute, because, at a minimum, the
tension between the definition . . . and the limited protection provided by subdivision
(iii) . . . if it is subject to that definition renders section 21F as a whole sufficiently ambigu-
ous to oblige us to give Chevron deference to the [SEC’s interpretation].”).
63 Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 412 (2011)
(some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
340 (1997)).
64 The “semantic” or “linguistic” canons are distinguished from the “substantive”
canons in that the former are a set of presumptions about how the legislature uses lan-
guage when it drafts a statute, while the latter are a set of canons that place a “thumb on
the scale” in favor of some judicially preferred policy outcome (e.g., the “rule of lenity”).
See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 202 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the semantic canons as “simply . . . a form of
textual analysis,” while the substantive canons “favor . . . a particular substantive out-
come”).  This Note relies primarily on the semantic canons of construction.
65 See Adam W. Kiracofe, Note, The Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response
and Proposal to Nicholas Rosenkranz’s Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 571, 574 (2004).
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they have a long history of use in the Anglo-American legal system,66 and are
a tool frequently relied upon by the Supreme Court and lower courts in
interpreting statutes.67
In this Part, Sections II.A and II.B will use a number of these semantic
canons as aids in construing the language of Dodd-Frank.  Then, Section II.C
discusses the significance of judicial respect for and understanding of the
legislative process in relation to the judicial role as the interpreter of statutes.
Section II.D critiques the view of the Second Circuit, SEC, and some com-
mentators that subsection (iii) of the whistleblower protection provision was
meant to incorporate the bulk of Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation protec-
tions.  Finally, Section II.E discusses the critique that the courts should
account for the remedial purpose of Dodd-Frank in construing the statute’s
language.
A. The Significance of a Definitional Section
When Congress chooses to supply a definition for use in a statute, it
should not come as a surprise that Congress likely intended the supplied
definition to govern.68  “When . . . a definitional section says that a word
66 See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 100
(2009) (describing the semantic canons of construction as “almost universally accepted as
helpful statutory interpretive devices”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Con-
struction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (noting that
Anglo-American judges have relied on the canons of construction for at least 400 years).
67 The canons are used quite frequently, and are used by Justices of both liberal and
conservative ideological bents. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085–87
(2015) (Ginsburg, J.) (plurality opinion) (using the ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis
canons); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012)
(Scalia, J.) (applying the canon that specific terms govern general terms); Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (O’Connor, J.) (applying the presumption disfavoring a
construction that would render terms as surplusage); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
568 (1995) (Kennedy, J.) (applying the presumption in favor of consistent meaning).
While the canons are frequently used, they have also attracted much modern criticism. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 309 (1996)
(describing the canons of construction as “fig leaves covering decisions reached on other
grounds”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016) (performing
an empirical analysis of Supreme Court cases in which the majority and dissent rely on the
same canon of construction to reach opposite conclusions); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on
the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (challenging the notion that the canons of construction can
provide a neutral method of interpreting statutes and arguing that various canons may be
used to cancel each other out).
68 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:07, at 227–28
(6th ed. 2000) (“As a rule a definition which declares what a term means is binding upon
the court.”); see also Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129–30 (2008) (“Statutory defi-
nitions control the meaning of statutory words . . . in the usual case.” (quoting Lawson v.
Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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‘means’ something, the clear import is that this is its only meaning.”69  Here,
the definition of “whistleblower” and its required application to the entire
antiretaliation provision could hardly be more clear, and should therefore
bind the courts.  The definitional section explicitly provides that: “In this sec-
tion the following definitions shall apply: . . . The term ‘whistleblower’ means
any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission.”70  First, the explicit application of the
definitions to the entire section is particularly important.  This creates a
strong presumption in favor of a consistent meaning of “whistleblower”
throughout all of § 78u–6.71
Second, the phrasing of the definition as “ ‘whistleblower’ means . . .” is
important because it creates a strong presumption that the definition pro-
vided in the statute is the only definition of “whistleblower” contemplated.72
Use of the word “means” implies that the definition is the term’s only defini-
tion: “A definition which declares what a term means . . . excludes any mean-
ing that is not stated.”73  This is consistent with the well-known expressio unius
canon of construction.  According to this canon, when a statutory provision
explicitly includes particular things, other things are implicitly excluded.74
By contrast, when a definition “declares what it ‘includes’ . . . ‘[i]t . . . conveys
the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically
enumerated.’”75  Ergo, according to the conventional rules of statutory inter-
pretation, the section’s definition is both mandatory and exclusive—only
individuals who provide information to the SEC are eligible to qualify as
whistleblowers, and that definition “shall apply” throughout § 78u–6.
The Second Circuit protested in its decision that “ ‘mechanical use of a
statutory definition’ is not always warranted.”76  It is certainly true that defini-
tions are merely one indication of the meaning of terms—albeit a strong
one—and may not necessarily call for literal application in every case.77
However, the exceptions to the strict application of a defined term are lim-
ited and will only apply where, for example, the definition is arbitrary, creates
69 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 226 (2012).
70 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
71 See infra Section II.B.
72 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
73 SINGER, supra note 68, § 47:07, at 232 (emphasis added).
74 See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“‘[W]hen a statute designates certain persons, things, or manners of operation, all omis-
sions should be understood as exclusions.’” (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754,
757 (9th Cir. 1991))); SINGER, supra note 68, § 47:23, at 304–07.
75 SINGER, supra note 68, § 47:07, at 231 (emphasis added) (quoting Argosy Ltd. v.
Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968)).
76 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Air
Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 697 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2012)).
77 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 69, at 228.
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obvious incongruities in the statute, defeats a major purpose of the legisla-
tion, or is so discordant to common usage as to generate confusion.78
In the Second Circuit’s opinion, Berman fell into the category of excep-
tions where a strict application of the definition would create incongruities in
the statute.  In support of that proposition, the Second Circuit analogized to
King v. Burwell as the case “closer to [Berman’s] case.”79  The grave statutory
conundrum the Supreme Court faced in King is a difference in kind, not
merely in degree, from the question faced by the Fifth Circuit and the Sec-
ond Circuit.  First, in King the Supreme Court was called on to construe gen-
uinely ambiguous language—whether the provision regarding subsidies for
insurance purchased on an “[e]xchange established by the State” only con-
templated state-run exchanges or also included federally-run exchanges,
where there were no relevant defined terms for aiding in answering the ques-
tion.80  In contrast, Dodd-Frank’s language explicitly provides for the scope
of its whistleblower protections by defining its terms.81  Second, the Supreme
Court in King faced the prospect of rendering an integral part of the Afforda-
ble Care Act ineffective depending on its chosen construction of the stat-
ute.82  In contrast, the straightforward application of Dodd-Frank’s definition
of “whistleblower” merely leaves subsection (iii) with a narrow scope that
could be considered suboptimal by those who favor broader whistleblower
protections.83
Likewise, the SEC’s interpretation, which would create two definitions of
“whistleblower” in § 78u–6—one for awards, and one for antiretaliation pro-
tections—is clearly not reasonable.84  The Second Circuit frames the ques-
tion to be decided as “whether the [definitional section] applies to another
provision of the statute.”85  But the statute itself has already provided the
answer to that question: “In this section the following definitions shall
apply.”86  The ordinary rules of statutory construction show that there can be
78 See SINGER, supra note 68, § 47:07, at 228–29.
79 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150.
80 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6) (2012).
82 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–93 (“Here, the statutory scheme compels us to reject
petitioners’ interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in
any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress
designed the Act to avoid.”); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
419–20 (1973) (“We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated
purposes.”).
83 See Pacella, supra note 24, at 748 (“The court in Asadi erred by rendering meaning-
less the specific reference to SOX in the third prong of subsection (h)(1)(A), providing no
supportable explanation for why Congress decided to include this language in Dodd-
Frank.  Interpreting the third prong . . . as inclusive of internal whistleblowers is consistent
with the overall scheme of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program itself . . . .”).
84 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
85 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2015).
86 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a) (emphasis added).
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only one definition of whistleblower in this section, and the provided defini-
tion is exclusive.
B. Presumption in Favor of Consistent Meaning
The presumption in favor of consistent meaning stands for the proposi-
tion that, “[i]n seeking to interpret [a statutory term], we adopt the premise
that the term should be construed, if possible, to give it a consistent meaning
throughout the Act.”87  The presumption arises from the common sense pre-
mise that when Congress uses a particular word throughout the same statute,
it likely intended for that word to mean the same thing in each instance it
was used.88  For example, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., the Supreme Court was
called on to interpret a statute that defined the term “prospectus” for the
purposes of one subsection, but not for the other subsections in which the
term was used.89  The Court ultimately determined that, if the statute were to
be interpreted as “symmetrical and coherent,” the term prospectus would
have to have a consistent meaning throughout the Act.90
However, the presumption may be overcome if it can be shown that Con-
gress clearly intended to use a term differently in different sections of a stat-
ute.91  The interpretation advanced by the SEC is that “whistleblower” has
two different meanings in the Dodd-Frank Act.92  Under the SEC’s reading,
Congress intended for the whistleblower definition provided in
§ 78u–6(a)(6) to apply to subsections (i) and (ii) in § 78u–6(h)(1)(A), but
meant for the whistleblowers under subsection (iii) to be a broader category
of individuals.  This is an entirely unreasonable reading of the statute.
Given that the general formulation of the rule, as discussed in Gustafson,
would apply a consistent definition across disparate sections of a statute, it
seems obvious that the presumption should apply with enhanced force where
an explicit definition of “whistleblower” applies to the entirety of the section.
As such, any attempt to interpret the provision to include multiple defini-
tions of “whistleblower” should be required to make a very clear showing to
overcome the presumption that the provided definition should apply to all of
87 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995).
88 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 64, at 215–16 (“[J]udges often try to discern
the meaning of ambiguous terms by looking to other terms in the statute and making
assumptions about how these other terms relate to the ambiguous language at issue. . . .
[T]hese so-called canons simply describe intuitive and familiar techniques that we all use,
sometimes unconsciously, in understanding language in context.”).
89 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568–70.
90 Id. at 569.
91 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595–96 (2004) (“The pre-
sumption of uniform usage thus relents when a word used has several commonly under-
stood meanings among which a speaker can alternate in the course of an ordinary
conversation, without being confused or getting confusing.”).
92 See SEC Interpretive Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 47,829–30; see also supra notes 16–18 and
accompanying text.
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the subsections.93  The Second Circuit’s argument that subsection (iii) was
inserted late in the legislative process, and the drafters would not have
intended the whistleblower definition to apply strictly to subsection (iii), is
not sufficient to overcome that presumption.94
C. Respect for the Legislative Process
Courts interpreting the whistleblower provisions have been faced with
the same age-old question that has long divided legal scholars—should a
court do what it thinks is best to carry into effect the background purposes of
a statute in light of the messy, hasty legislative process where staffers may
overlook the fact that a newly added provision does not mesh well with the
old language; or should a court strictly apply the language that managed to
run the legislative gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment as the best evi-
dence of Congress’s purpose, given the low likelihood that the court will be
able to accurately guess how Congress would have preferred the pieces fit
together if legislators had thought of it?95
The Second Circuit places a great deal of weight on the fact that subsec-
tion (iii) was inserted into Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections when the
conference committee began to reconcile the House and Senate bills.  Under
the Second Circuit’s reading, the fact that subsection (iii) doesn’t fit “neatly”
together with the definitional section or the other subsections in the
antiretaliation provisions is merely reflective of the “realities of the legislative
process.”96  The Second Circuit frames the question as whether the drafters,
in inserting subsection (iii) with its references to SOX’s protections, would
have expected the new subsection to have the “extremely limited scope it
would have if it were restricted by the Commission reporting requirement” in
the definitional section.97
The Second Circuit, however, is asking the wrong question.  It is not the
role of the court to determine what the drafters would have wanted the stat-
ute to accomplish in the abstract; it is the court’s role to apply the statutory
language that the drafters actually drafted.  The court should not attempt to
fix the statute because it hypothesizes that the drafters must have inserted the
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6) (2012) (“In this section the following definitions shall
apply . . . .”).
94 See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2015).
95 Compare id. at 154, and Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (“Should one not look to the background of a
statute, the terms of the debate over its enactment, the factual assumptions the legislators
made, the conventions they thought applicable, and their expressed objectives in an effort
to understand the statute’s relevant context, conventions, and purposes?”), with SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 69, at 56–58 (“[T]he purpose must be derived from the text, not from
extrinsic sources . . . or an assumption about the legal drafter’s desires.”), and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 690 (1990) (“[T]extualists remind
us that statutory interpretation is, most of all, textual analysis.  We start with the text, and
most practitioners end with the text . . . .”).
96 Berman, 801 F.3d at 154.
97 Id. at 155.
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provision “hastily” at the “last minute” and the straightforward application of
the statute must therefore be erroneous and an oversight.98  Instead, respect
for the “realities of the legislative process” would be better served by applying
the language as it was enacted.99  Textualists have long argued that the legis-
lative process is one built on compromise.100  While, to the Second Circuit,
subsection (iii)’s scope may seem like an oversight that Congress would have
fixed if the issue had been brought to its attention, many would argue that
the exact scope of that provision may have been a necessary byproduct of the
legislative process.101  Who is to say that Congress would have assented to
subsection (iii)’s addition to the statute at all if it had explicitly provided for
protection for internal whistleblowing?102  It would be presumptuous of the
court to jump to that conclusion.  Furthermore, while Congress may have
agreed on the purposes for the whistleblower protection provisions, that is not
to say that Congress would have been in unanimous agreement about the
means to carry out those purposes.  Again, textualists would argue that “the
choice of means may be the product of hard-fought legislative compromise”
and for the court to abstract out of a statute’s background purposes a man-
date to broaden the literal text of a statute would “dishonor[ ] the legislative
choice.”103
The Fifth Circuit’s approach, then, is far more respectful of the duties of
judges to operate subject to the constraints of legislative supremacy in our
system of government.104  Critics of the Fifth Circuit’s approach essentially
argue that one may somehow manufacture an ambiguity when viewing two
independently unambiguous provisions in combination, even though the
two provisions do not produce an outright conflict, but merely produce “ten-
sion” in the sense that one portion of one provision is left with a small—
though still very real105—scope.  “Tension” is far too low a bar to possibly
serve as the threshold necessary to render a statutory provision ambiguous.
The Second Circuit’s understanding of the “realities of the legislative pro-
98 Id. at 154–55.
99 Id. at 154.
100 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994).
101 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 74–75 (2006).
102 See id. at 92.
103 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 654–55 (7th ed. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eas-
terbrook, supra note 100, at 68).
104 See Manning, supra note 101, at 96.
105 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting
that the third category of activity would include a scenario in which an individual makes
concurrent reports to the SEC and internally, but her employer fires her on the basis of
her internal report, unaware that she made a report to the SEC). But see Leifer, supra note
6, at 139 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s hypothetical is an “unlikely scenario” in which it
is “hard to imagine what motivations would prompt the employee to make this [form of]
disclosure at all”).
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cess” draws the improper conclusion—merely because the legislative process
is imperfect does not give the court leeway to ignore the clear and unambigu-
ous text of a statute.106
D. Purpose of Subsection (iii)
For the Second Circuit, the purpose of subsection (iii) is another source
of tension within the whistleblower provisions.  Subsection (iii) provides that:
No employer may [retaliate] against[ ] a whistleblower in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter,
including section 78j–1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of title 18, and any
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.107
In the Second Circuit’s eyes, subsection (iii) was meant to incorporate
the full scope of the whistleblower protections of SOX by reference, includ-
ing protection of internal reporting.108  For the Second Circuit and
likeminded commentators, if subsection (iii) is limited by the whistleblower
definition, the incorporation of SOX’s protection by reference would not be
fully accomplished, and only a small sliver of the activities SOX protects
would also gain protection under Dodd-Frank.109  But the Second Circuit
and others fail to consider the possibility that subsection (iii) was not in fact
intended to incorporate the entirety of SOX.
Proponents of broader whistleblower protections fail to take into
account the alternative characterization of subsection (iii) as a residual or
catchall section.  I argue that the language of subsection (iii) is far more
susceptible of this interpretation than as a wholesale importation of SOX’s
whistleblower protections by reference.  The language of subsection (iii)
should more properly be read as a laundry list of the many reasons besides
those provided in subsections (i) or (ii) that a whistleblower may have been
motivated to report illegal activity to the SEC: viz., because of disclosures oth-
106 Indeed, it is telling that, in reaching the opposite conclusion of this Note, the Sec-
ond Circuit cited Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States—that old chestnut of statutory
interpretation and perhaps the ne plus ultra of purposivist reasoning divorced from the
text.  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra
note 64, at 39–40 (describing Church of the Holy Trinity as representative of “strong purposi-
vism” and characterizing the Court’s reasoning as “deciding that its job, as Congress’s faith-
ful agent, was to cut back the statute to give effect to its background purpose or general
aim” even though “in no uncertain terms . . . [the case] fell within the prohibition of the
[statute]”).
107 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A), (A)(iii) (2012).
108 See Berman, 801 F.3d at 153–54; see also Pacella, supra note 24, at 745 (describing
subsection (iii) as an “express incorporation of the SOX antiretaliation provision into
Dodd-Frank”).
109 See Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–53; Leifer, supra note 6, at 139–40, 148–49; Pacella,
supra note 24, at 745–46.
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erwise required or protected by SOX,110 the securities laws,111 criminal stat-
utes,112 or any other law or regulation relevant to the SEC’s jurisdiction.113
The most natural reading of that list is “as a safety net that Congress used to
sweep up anything it had forgotten to include.”114  Far from being an incor-
poration by reference of every whistleblower provision of SOX, subsection
(iii) was instead meant to perform the function of the proverbial “belt and
suspenders.”115
Furthermore, if subsection (iii) is read to be analogous to a residual or
catchall clause, the problems of “surplusage” and “mootness” that so vexed
the Second Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and commentators become less impor-
tant.116  This is so because catchall provisions are, in some sense, intended to
include redundancies—for example, the securities laws are replete with defi-
nitions that include long lists of terms that appear to have been lifted straight
from a thesaurus,117 and that under one reading could be considered to vio-
late the canon that each term in a statute should be construed to have inde-
pendent meaning if possible.118  The better reading of provisions such as
subsection (iii) is as an attempt by the legislature to cover all of its bases.
Under this reading, the Fifth Circuit was correct not to have been concerned
with the relative scope of its hypothetical situation that would satisfy subsec-
tion (iii)’s requirements.119  A small scope for subsection (iii)’s SOX protec-
tions is consistent with the subsection’s purpose as a gap-filler, and the
narrow scope of the protections when the literal definition of whistleblower is
applied to subsection (iii) may even suggest that this is the proper construc-
tion of the text.  The scope of the SOX protections included in the catchall
provision need not be large so long as the operation of the subsection will
appropriately sweep up any circumstances that Congress may have left out
110 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (“required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002”).
111 Id. (“required or protected under . . . this chapter”).  Chapter 2B of Title 15 codifies
the federal securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a, Securities Exchanges.
112 Id. (“required or protected under . . . section 1513(e) of title 18”).  18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(e) criminalizes retaliation against an informant who provides information relating
to the commission of a federal offense to a law enforcement officer.
113 Id. (“required or protected under . . . any other law, rule, or regulation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission”).
114 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 587 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115 See, e.g., TMW Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added) (quoting In re SRC Holding Corp., 545 F.3d 661, 670 (8th Cir. 2008)).
116 See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2015); Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013); Leifer, supra note 6, at
137–39; Petkova, supra note 5, at 583–84.
117 See, e.g., Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing examples from
the securities laws).
118 This is known as the “antisurplusage canon” or the “whole-text canon.” See MAN-
NING & STEPHENSON, supra note 64, at 228–29 (stating that “judges should construe statutes
so that every term and provision is meaningful, if it is possible to do so”); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 69, at 167–69.
119 See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–28.
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through oversight.  Critics who argue that Congress could not have intended
such a small scope for subsection (iii)’s SOX protections are operating from
an incorrect base assumption—they automatically assume that Dodd-Frank’s
reference to SOX requirements and protections was intended to ensure that
Dodd-Frank was at least as broad as SOX.  I argue that that reading attributes
greater effect to one subsection than is warranted.
However, this is not to say that the antisurplusage canon is not relevant
to the discussion of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections at all.  Indeed,
the antisurplusage canon applies with full force to the definitional section of
the whistleblower provisions, and the broad SEC and Second Circuit inter-
pretations of subsection (iii) would render the definition’s requirement that
reports be made “to the Commission” entirely superfluous by permitting an
individual to qualify as a whistleblower irrespective of the clear external
reporting requirement embedded in those three words.120
E. Remedial Purpose or Public Policy
Finally, one critique of the narrower reading of the antiretaliation provi-
sion argues that courts should adopt a broad and flexible reading of securi-
ties statutes that have a remedial purpose.121  Proponents of this argument
point to the Court’s decision in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, which held
that “securities laws combating fraud should be construed ‘not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’”122
According to this argument, the whistleblower protection provisions of
Dodd-Frank were meant to serve a remedial purpose—namely, to “improv[e]
accountability and transparency in the financial system” following the 2008
financial crisis123—and insofar as the text of the statute is supportive of a
broad reading, the statute’s provisions should be construed broadly to effec-
tuate that general purpose.124
The Herman rule, then, operates as a substantive presumption about how
to construe ambiguous text.  This critique is inapposite: in order to apply the
Herman rule’s substantive presumption, the text must be susceptible to more
than one meaning.  That is not the case here.125  As has been already noted,
there is no outright ambiguity in the text of Dodd-Frank—instead, the defini-
tion of whistleblower is unambiguous, and literally applies to the antiretalia-
120 See id. at 628 (“Moreover, it is Asadi’s suggested construction of the whistleblower-
protection provision that arguably renders statutory text superfluous.  Specifically, Asadi’s
suggested construction would read the words ‘to the Commission’ out of the definition.”).
121 See Leifer, supra note 6, at 140–42 (describing “the Herman rule” as standing for the
proposition that “remedial statutes should be interpreted broadly and flexibly”).
122 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983) (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
123 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26, 28,
31, and 42 U.S.C.); see also supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
124 See Leifer, supra note 6, at 143–45.
125 See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
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tion provisions.  The Supreme Court has previously cautioned that “we would
not be inclined to read [a securities statute] more broadly than its language
and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.”126  Consistent with this prece-
dent, it makes little sense to apply a presumption about the remedial nature
of the statute in this context given the clear scope of the text.  In any event,
discussions of the remedial nature of the statute are unpersuasive for an addi-
tional reason: if the text were truly ambiguous, the court would be required
to defer to the SEC’s interpretation under Chevron, making any application
of the Herman rule moot.127
Furthermore, I question the utility of characterizing the background
purpose of the statute beyond the words and provisions contained within the
text, a position many others have taken before me.128  Rather, the best evi-
dence of a statute’s meaning or purpose is the objective text enacted in the
statute’s operative provisions by Congress and signed into law.129  The judici-
ary has at its disposal adequate tools of statutory interpretation, in the form
of the semantic and substantive canons of construction, for use in resolving
ambiguities without using a judge’s subjective understanding of which general
background aims and purposes Congress may have had in mind in fashion-
ing a statute.  Only where the text of the statute itself is ambiguous in the first
place can turning to legislative history as evidence of meaning or purpose be
justified—or, to put it plainly, only as a last resort in exceptional cases.  The
plain meaning of Dodd-Frank makes this unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this Note argues that the most natural reading of Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower provisions is one that focuses primarily on external
whistleblowing.  This textually constrained reading of the statute is more
faithful to congressional intent and the judicial role.  While courts are quite
good at interpreting texts, they are far less ably equipped to divine the spe-
126 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978).
127 Assuming arguendo that the SEC’s interpretation could be considered reasonable.
Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
128 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“As
we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative
history or any other extrinsic material.”); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its
illegitimacy.  We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”); Eskridge,
supra note 95, at 625 (noting textualism’s emphasis that “the Court should devote more of
its energy to analyzing statutory texts” and that “legislative history is, at best, secondary and
supporting evidence of statutory meaning”).  But for a defense of the use of legislative
history, see Breyer, supra note 95, at 847, 874 (arguing that “legislative history helps appel-
late courts reach interpretations that tend to make the law itself more coherent, workable,
or fair” and “[t]he ‘problem’ of legislative history is its ‘abuse,’ not its ‘use’”).
129 See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290
(2010) (emphasizing “that judges in our system of government have a duty to enforce
clearly worded statutes as written, even if there is reason to believe that the text may not
perfectly capture the background aims or purposes that inspired their enactment”).
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cific purpose or intent of Congress when it structures a statute in one way
over another.  The fact that Congress provided a definition section in which
“whistleblower” was a defined term, and proceeded to use that defined term
in a subsequent provision of the same section lends itself to the natural infer-
ence that Congress intended that definition to control, notwithstanding the
fact that the section may have alluded to other statutes with differing stan-
dards.  Indeed, it is arguable that the fact that Congress knew of the alterna-
tive reporting requirements available in SOX, and yet apparently chose not
to utilize those same requirements in Dodd-Frank, would seem to imply the
rejection of that alternative remedy.130  If Congress intended to incorporate
the alternative requirements of SOX for the antiretaliation provision,
“backdooring” the protections through a subsection seems a peculiar way to
do so.  The definition section demonstrates that Congress knows perfectly
well how to make its intentions clear—which is to say, why would Congress
incorporate SOX’s protections through a window rather than through a
door?131
It may very well be that a statute that protected internal whistleblowing
as well as external whistleblowing would better serve the purposes of combat-
ing illegal activity and encouraging compliance with financial regulations.  I
think there are meritorious arguments in favor of protecting internal
whistleblowing.132  The merit of a statute with provisions protecting internal
whistleblowing notwithstanding, that is not the statute that Congress enacted.
The rule that the Second Circuit has adopted is a perfectly reasonable one,
and likely would function quite well—nonetheless, it does violence to our con-
stitutional structure to permit the courts to alter the statutes enacted by Con-
gress, merely because the statute’s operation is less than optimal.133  The
desirability of a particular construction of a statute does not give the SEC or
the courts the prerogative to adopt a broader interpretation of the statute
than the text would permit.134  This Note argues that the Second Circuit
overstepped the bounds of the judicial role.  Where the terms of a statute are
unambiguous and the operation of the statute is neither impeded by irrecon-
cilable provisions nor ineluctably hobbled by the plain meaning of the words,
the courts have an obligation to enforce the statute as written.135
130 See the discussion of the expressio unius canon, supra notes 73–78 and accompany-
ing text.
131 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does
not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
132 See Pacella, supra note 24, at 754–60.
133 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 292 (1989) (arguing legislative supremacy requires that “[w]hen statutory language
and legislative intent are unambiguous, courts may not take action to the contrary”); see
also Manning, supra note 129, at 1290.
134 Cf. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117 (1978) (“We do not think [the statute] was
meant to be such a cure-all. . . . If extension of the [SEC’s] summary suspension power is
desirable, the proper source of that power is Congress.”).
135 However, where a statute contains truly irreconcilable provisions, or where the
terms are ambiguous and one interpretation of the ambiguous terms would seriously
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Though I conclude that the straightforward application of the
whistleblower definition is the proper outcome, it is not lost on me that the
Fifth Circuit and I are outliers in our determinations.136  Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has rejected rules adopted by a majority of the lower courts
before, and I argue that is what should occur in this context.137  Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg, speaking for the Court in Lawson v. FMR LLC, hinted in
passing that she may agree with the narrower interpretation, noting that
“Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision . . . focuses primarily on reporting to
federal authorities.”138  Whether a decision by the Court adopting the nar-
rower interpretation will come to pass remains an open question, but the
confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch to succeed Justice Scalia on the Court
seems to bode well for an interpretation tethered to the plain meaning of the
text.139
undermine the effectiveness of the statute, it is appropriate—operating from the assump-
tion that Congress would not enact a statute it intended to be a failure—for a court to opt
for a reasonable interpretation that will ensure the statute is effective. Cf. King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way
that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.” (emphasis added)); see also supra
notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
136 The Second Circuit’s reasoning has been winning the battle of the string citations:
the Ninth Circuit and the majority of district courts deciding the question in the first
instance appear to have taken its view. See, e.g., Somers v. Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d
1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Somers v. Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD
Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149, 2014 WL 940703 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Ellington
v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d
1094 (D. Colo. 2013); see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[A] far larger number of district courts have deemed the statute ambiguous and deferred
to the SEC’s Rule.”).  Only a handful of district courts have adopted the Fifth Circuit’s
view. See, e.g., Verfeuth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640 (E.D. Wis. 2014);
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
No. 12-cv-00381, 2013 WL 3786643 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013).
137 Cf. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2001) (rejecting the “catalyst theory” for award of attorneys’ fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 that had previously been accepted by every court of appeals but
one).
138 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1175 (2014).
139 See Eric Citron, Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-neil-gorsuch/ (describ-
ing Judge Gorsuch as “an ardent textualist”); Matt Ford, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch for
the U.S. Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/01/gorsuch-trump-supreme-court/515232/.
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